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also explores how rapid aging of the population protected by the ADEA might inhibit the ADEA's
effectiveness, and raises questions about possible changes in age discrimination policies and enforcement
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I.  Introduction 
  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was passed 40 years ago.  The 
original Act prohibited discrimination on the basis of age for those aged 40-65.  Subsequent 
amendments raised the upper age limit to 70 and then eliminated it altogether, ending mandatory 
retirement for nearly all workers.  In this review I take stock of how successful the ADEA has 
been at achieving its intended goals.  I also discuss important changes in the context in which the 
ADEA will operate, to assess how well the ADEA will continue to achieve its goals in that 
changing context, and to contemplate how it might be made more effective.  In particular, I focus 
on the challenges posed by an aging population in the United States.  I consider the role the 
ADEA – perhaps with some adaptation – might play in meeting these challenges, as well as the 
potential consequences of an aging population for the effectiveness of the ADEA.  My review 
touches on many aspects of the ADEA, but emphasizes the issues that seem most relevant to the 
effectiveness of the ADEA in the context of an aging population.
1  Because these are primarily 
economics issues, the review emphasizes findings from the economics literature.   
II. Assessing the ADEA in Light of the Aging of the U.S. Population 
  The aging of the population in the United States will pose significant public policy 
challenges over the next few decades.  Most significantly, population aging means that public 
policy must be increasingly concerned with the employment of older individuals, because 
continued employment implies lower dependency ratios, greater income, more tax revenues, and 
decreased public expenditures on health insurance, retirement benefits, and income support 
(depending on the age of the individual and their economic circumstances).  In light of these 
concerns, perhaps the most important lens through which it is useful to view the ADEA is its 
potential to encourage the continued employment of those older Americans who desire to 
continue working, or, conversely, to discourage discriminatory behavior that might reduce  
2 
employment of these individuals.  The potential for the latter type of discrimination is real, 
although as discussed in greater detail later in this paper, harder to establish in fact.   
Until recently, the large cohorts of the Baby Boom were passing through the prime ages 
of adulthood.  As shown in Figure 1, across the years 1990 and 2000, the share of the population 
in the 45-64 range grew somewhat, and the share in this age group was quite a bit larger than the 
share in the group aged 65 and over.  Those aged 45-64 were likely to be strongly affected by the 
ADEA, which covered workers aged 40 and over.  On the other hand, in the next few decades 
(after 2010) there will be a declining share aged 45-64 and a rapidly increasing share aged 65 
and over, with the two shares approaching equality by the middle of the century.  These shifts in 
the age structure of the population suggest that to the extent that the ADEA has a role to play in 
maintaining or encouraging employment of older workers, its impact on those beyond what has 
been considered the “normal” retirement age of 65 will become relatively more important than it 
has been in the past.  This has important implications for age discrimination policy.   
First, employment rates of those under age 65 are already quite high (in 2006, 77.8 
percent for 20-44 year-olds, and 71.9 percent for 45-64 year-olds); in contrast, employment rates 
of those aged 65 and over are low (15 percent in 2006).
2  Thus, if the ADEA has the potential to 
boost employment of older individuals, its greatest potential lies among those past the normal 
retirement age, both because of the population shift into this age group, and because of its low 
baseline employment rate.  Second, given that ADEA enforcement has tended to focus on 
terminations, it seems likely that, in recent decades, its impact has centered more on continued 
employment of those younger than the normal retirement age.  Without suggesting that this is 
becoming less important, it seems clear that if age discrimination plays any role in suppressing 
employment of those older than age 65, then figuring out how the ADEA can contribute to 
rooting out discrimination against these older individuals becomes of prime policy importance.    
3 
Second, a sizable share of any increases in employment among those aged 65 and over is 
likely to come not from continued employment in their long-term careers, but rather from part-
time or shorter-term jobs, perhaps at subsequent employers, in the form of what has sometimes 
been labeled “partial retirement” (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier 2000) or bridge jobs (e.g., 
Cahill, Giandrea, and Quinn 2005).  On the other hand, Abraham and Houseman (2005) present 
evidence that older workers face difficulties in moving from a longer-term career job to new 
employment characterized by partial retirement, and may consequently end up retiring before 
they might otherwise have done.  Abraham and Houseman do not necessarily attribute these 
problems to age discrimination in hiring, but they suggest it may be a contributing factor.  If 
older individuals are increasingly likely to look for a bridge job after leaving their full-time 
career, which Cahill et al. predict, then the focus of ADEA enforcement on terminations might 
not serve the nation as well going forward.  Instead, it might become relatively more important to 
figure out how to ensure that age discrimination also does not deter hiring of older individuals 
seeking employment subsequent to leaving career jobs.
3        
The third implication of an aging population for age discrimination policy is that efforts 
to reduce age discrimination contrast with other policy responses to an aging population in an 
important way.  In particular, policies that reduce incentives for retirement, increase retirement 
ages by fiat, and reduce the value of private and public pensions, especially after some 
retirement-related decisions have been made, likely result in reduced economic well-being for 
older individuals.  In contrast, to the extent that age discrimination acts to deter employment of 
older individuals, efforts to reduce its influence – assuming they do not impose undue costs – can 
increase the welfare of those individuals who wish to keep working and are enabled to do so, 
while at the same time helping to achieve the broader goal of keeping Americans at work longer 
(not to mention protecting the civil rights of older individuals).  Moreover, the ability of older  
4 
individuals to respond to policy changes intended to increase incentives for employment will be 
enhanced if discrimination that otherwise deters this employment can be reduced; this implies 
that more effective efforts against age discrimination may enable policymakers to meet the 
challenges of an aging population with less drastic changes in retirement policies and incentives.     
On the other hand, the ADEA also has its critics.  Some charge that age discrimination is 
overstated and that the ADEA instead simply benefits older workers at the expense of other 
workers.  Others stake out a less extreme view, but nonetheless argue that the ADEA has adverse 
unintended consequences (e.g., Friedman 1984; Lahey, forthcoming).  These more critical 
perspectives suggest that an aging population may exacerbate the problems generated by the 
ADEA, becoming more a hindrance than a help in coming decades.  Consequently, this paper 
also assesses the evidence pertaining to these critiques of the ADEA.   
III. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Enforcement Activity 
  The EEOC is responsible for federal enforcement of the ADEA.
4  An individual wanting 
to pursue a claim must first file a charge with the EEOC (or, in states with similar statutes, with 
state Fair Employment Practices (FEP) commissions or agencies).
5  The EEOC may choose to 
investigate based on the facts presented, dismissing the case if it does not see a violation of the 
law.  For charges not dismissed, the EEOC can seek a settlement or mediation, and if these are 
unsuccessful it may choose to file suit, which happens in a very small share of cases – in general 
for larger cases likely to involve a sizable class.  The individual retains a right to sue after the 
EEOC process has run its course, regardless of the EEOC’s determination.  Information on 
charges brought to the EEOC and on EEOC litigation provides some idea of the landscape of 
enforcement of the ADEA, and how it compares to other anti-discrimination laws.
6   
Tables 1 and 2 give information on the types of discrimination that are alleged in charges 
received by the EEOC and in EEOC litigation.  Table 1 reports the breakdown of bases or issues  
5 
alleged in charges in total and under the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 
Title VII (which covers discrimination based on race, sex, ethnicity, etc.).  Table 2 gives similar 
information on the types of discrimination alleged in suits brought by the EEOC in 2006.  These 
are grouped not by statute, but by the type of discrimination alleged.  Table 1 shows that charges 
related to discharges and layoffs are more common in ADEA cases than in Title VII cases, while 
Table 2 shows that they are also more common in age cases than in race or sex cases that are 
litigated.  Charges related to involuntary retirement, while not common, are largely confined to 
ADEA claims, while wage cases are relatively uncommon – not surprisingly, given that older 
workers are on average more highly paid than younger workers, although obviously this masks a 
great deal of heterogeneity.   
The tables also show that hiring cases, in general, are much less common than discharge 
or layoff cases, although they do constitute a larger share of ADEA charges than of ADA or Title 
VII charges, or of issues alleged in race and sex cases that are litigated.  The paucity of hiring 
relative to discharge or layoff cases could reflect the actual nature of the types of discrimination 
being experienced.  But it may also reflect consequences of the legal structure.  First, hiring 
cases are more difficult to prove, because it is more difficult to identify a class of affected 
workers.  In contrast, in discharge or layoff cases the class typically consists of a group of 
workers previously employed at a firm.  Second, damages may be considerably higher in 
discharge or layoff cases, since workers lose jobs, and for older workers the job may have been 
relatively high paying and there is evidence of difficulties finding new jobs; in addition, there 
can be substantial lost pension wealth accruals.  In contrast, damages in a hiring case may be 
quite small, because an individual not hired by one employer may soon be hired subsequently by 
another employer.  Finally, injunctive relief in hiring cases – hiring the worker who filed the 
claim – is unlikely to be attractive to a plaintiff.
7    
6 
These barriers to pursuing claims of hiring discrimination are potentially quite important 
in light of the evidence noted earlier that workers aged 65 and over, often working in jobs 
subsequent to a long-term career, are an increasing source of potential employment growth.  If 
the distribution of cases under the ADEA reflects “structural” problems in combating age 
discrimination in hiring relative to discharges or layoffs, then the ADEA may become a less 
useful tool in the future than it has been in the past, when the bulge of protected workers was in 
the age range in which they were likely to be employed in – and perhaps fired from – their career 
jobs.      
IV. Key Issues and Recent Changes in Interpreting the ADEA 
  Two recent changes in the interpretation of the ADEA may be particularly significant for 
future developments, and influence how well the ADEA serves the nation’s needs in coming 
decades.  First, in 2004 the EEOC approved a rule regarding health benefits that eased the 
restrictions imposed by an earlier ruling (Erie County Retiree’s Association v. County of Erie 
2000).  The 2004 rule, subsequently upheld by the courts, made it easier for employers to 
coordinate retiree health benefits with Medicare – mainly by not requiring employers to show 
that the benefits are identical to benefits received by early retirees who are not eligible for 
Medicare.  It was a response to fears among employer and worker organizations that the Erie 
ruling would lead to the elimination of retiree health plans to avoid the risk of violating the 
ADEA.
8   
Although this ruling applies to retirees, related issues can potentially arise for employees 
aged 65 and over who are eligible for Medicare.  Currently, EEOC regulations allow employers 
to coordinate with Medicare, as long as doing so does not result in a reduction of benefits of any 
type.
9  However, as indicated by the difficulties to which the EEOC responded after the Erie 
decision, employers may be wary of trying to coordinate Medicare coverage with their group  
7 
health plans for employees aged 65 and over.  I return to this issue below.  
Second, because of the “reasonable factors other than age” exception, which recognizes 
that factors other than age can lead to the appearance that age drove an employment-related 
decision, a sequence of court rulings – most notably the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazen Paper Co. 
v. Biggin, in 1993 – had made it considerably more difficult to use disparate impact as the basis 
of age discrimination claims.
10  However, in Smith v. City of Jackson (2005), the Supreme Court 
ruled that the ADEA allows disparate-impact claims, although the standard for such a claim is 
higher than in Title VII cases, requiring that plaintiffs also be able to identify specific practices 
that have an adverse impact on older workers, and putting less burden of proof on the defendant 
to establish that there is a business justification for the practice.
11  It is likely that this decision 
will make it easier for plaintiffs to pursue age discrimination claims.  This may be particularly 
true with regard to hiring of individuals in the older age ranges that will see population growth in 
the decades ahead, given that hiring cases are likely to argue based on disparate impact.   
V. Evidence on Age Discrimination  
If age discrimination persists in U.S. labor markets, then continued vigilance with 
regarding to enforcing the ADEA is likely to prove helpful in meeting the challenges of 
population aging – especially if coupled with creativity in thinking about how the law and its 
enforcement might be modified to better meet these challenges.  On the other hand, there is 
research that contends that enforcement of the ADEA has some harmful effects for older 
workers, or for economic efficiency generally, and in the extreme argues that the ADEA does 
more harm than good and perhaps even addresses a non-existent age discrimination problem.  
Thus, in assessing the effectiveness of the ADEA, it is important to focus on both the need for 
policies to combat age discrimination and on the effectiveness of these policies (if they are 
needed).  This section, which considers recent evidence on age discrimination, and the next  
8 
section, which looks at the effects of laws prohibiting age discrimination, takes up these issues. 
Overall, it is no easy matter to establish the existence of age discrimination, except for 
rare cases of overt expressions of discriminatory intent.  This is little different from the case for 
race and sex discrimination, about which labor economists (and others) still argue.  And 
detecting evidence of age discrimination is a bit more difficult because there are legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons why age may affect labor market outcomes – principal among them 
considerations suggested by the human capital model.   
   Prior to the ADEA, two sets of facts were emphasized as evidence of age discrimination, 
both of which pertained to discrimination in hiring.  First, Miller (1966) argued that older 
workers who lost their jobs had more difficulty finding new jobs than did prime-age workers, 
based on both higher unemployment rates and longer durations of unemployment.  Second, the 
original U.S. Department of Labor report (1965) arguing for passage of the ADEA cited 
evidence from the late 1950’s of widespread prevalence of upper age limits for new hires.  The 
report interpreted this overt discriminatory behavior as stemming form incorrect negative 
stereotypes regarding older workers.
12 
The passage of the ADEA has surely resulted in the elimination of explicit upper age 
limits for jobs.  It is less clear that longer unemployment durations for older individuals 
disappeared.  As shown in Table 3, BLS data indicate that older individuals are still considerably 
more likely to have long unemployment durations.  However, these longer durations do not 
necessarily reflect discrimination against older workers.  Moreover, unemployment rates of older 
individuals are lower than those of other age groups, and substantially lower than those of young 
individuals.  This remains true even if we count discouraged workers as unemployed, although it 
is possible that other older individuals simply decide to retire because of poor job prospects and 
no longer report themselves as available to work or discouraged.
13     
9 
It is harder to establish what has happened with respect to negative stereotypes about 
older workers.  A large body of research studies whether there are negative stereotypes about 
older workers that appear to adversely affect them in the labor market, with many researchers 
concluding that there is such evidence (e.g., Finkelstein, Burke, and Raju 1995; Kite et al. 2005).  
More recently, however, Gordon and Arvey (2004) suggest that negative age stereotypes may 
have declined, perhaps due to EEOC policy as well as improved relative performance of older 
workers among more recent cohorts.  If EEOC policy has helped to break down negative 
stereotypes by leading to more objective appraisals of workers, then the law may have become 
less necessary, unless in its absence employers would resort to using age as a screening device.  
On the other hand, we do not really know from the existing research whether negative 
stereotypes have declined with respect to those in the 65 and over age category who will be an 
increasing share of older potential workers in coming decades.  If past policy has done little to 
address stereotypes about this older group, then it may still have a quite important role to play.   
Ultimately, though, negative stereotypes are important only insofar as they affect labor 
market outcomes, and age differences in labor market outcomes do not necessarily imply age 
discrimination.  In addition, there may be reasons for age discrimination other than negative 
stereotypes.  Thus, to better understand the role of age discrimination in labor markets, we 
require evidence on age-related differences in labor market outcomes that try account for non-
discriminatory explanations of these differences.   
   In recent years “audit studies,” in which pairs of matched applicants are sent to apply for 
jobs, and outcomes are compared, have been used to test for age discrimination; in this context, 
applicants are matched on all characteristics except for age.  A closely related method is a 
“correspondence study,” which relies instead on sending out resumes and measuring outcomes in 
terms of being invited in for an interview or other expressions of interest in hiring.
14  The first  
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versions of these studies for the United States were by Bendick and co-authors, who did a 
correspondence study of hiring in three white-collar occupations (Bendick, Jackson, and Romero 
1996), and an audit study in the Washington, DC metropolitan area of hiring in entry-level 
management and sales positions (Bendick, Brown, and Wall 1999).  Both studies found evidence 
consistent with age discrimination against older workers.     
However, a fundamental problem with using these methods to study age discrimination is 
that there is no natural way to make older and younger workers identical in all respects other 
than age.  We would expect an older worker to have more experience than a younger worker.  If 
the information on the resumes or conveyed by the testers reveals this, then we might find more 
favorable outcomes for the more-experienced worker, irrespective of the other influences of age.  
To account for this, Bendick et al. try to hold human capital constant by giving the older and 
younger applicants (aged 32 and 57) the same number of years (ten) in the occupation for which 
they were applying, with the older applicants indicating that they had been out of the labor force 
raising children, working as a high school teacher, or in the military, depending on the job for 
which they were applying and the sex of the applicant pool.  But this other fictitious experience 
could be viewed negatively by employers, as perhaps suggesting that interests lie elsewhere, 
work is not a priority, etc., and this could explain adverse outcomes for older applicants.   
A more recent correspondence study by Lahey (2008) focuses on women in two urban 
labor markets, and also finds evidence consistent with age discrimination.  Lahey attempts to 
address the difficulty of making older and younger applicants alike in a number of ways.  She 
studies women, for whom she suggests time out of the labor force (even if only inferred by 
employers) is less likely to be a negative signal of ability, motivation, etc., than for men.  She 
also studies entry-level jobs (really the only possibility in correspondence studies), so one might 
think previous experience is a bit less of an issue.    
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Perhaps most important, the resumes she uses include only a 10-year job history, which 
Lahey argues is the “current resume standard.”  However, it is unclear how the “missing” history 
for older applicants affects employers’ assessments.  If all employers ever see are resumes with 
10-year job histories, then they can only make assumptions about what the older applicant was 
doing in the long period not covered by the job history.  If the employer assumes the applicant 
was working, then the presumption might be that she has more experience, perhaps working in 
favor of older applicants.  But if the employer assumes the applicant was not working, this could 
be viewed as a negative signal about productivity.  On the other hand, if employers expect a 
longer job history for older applicants, then its absence may be viewed as a negative signal about 
older applicants.  Lahey cites conversations with three human resource managers, stating: “They 
all said that ten-year histories are the current gold standard for resumes, although they get many 
resumes that do not look like the standard” (Lahey 2008:34, note 10).  However, this does not 
establish that earlier job history information would not convey useful information, or that its 
absence would not be perceived negatively.  Moreover, since younger individuals are much more 
likely to be applying for jobs than are older workers, perceptions regarding the so-called “gold-
standard” for resumes may be shaped by the fact that the sample of resumes that tends to be 
observed is biased toward younger applicants who rarely have more than ten years of experience.   
This discussion emphasizes that there are inherent limitations in using audit studies to 
study age discrimination.  Nonetheless, these limitations do not necessarily bias the results 
towards finding evidence of discrimination against older workers.  In sum, the 
audit/correspondence studies should probably be viewed as providing at most suggestive 
evidence of age discrimination in hiring. 
Although recent empirical work has focused on hiring, it is clear from ADEA 
enforcement activity that there are also at least allegations of age discrimination based on  
12 
discharges, layoffs, promotions, and other outcomes.  Adams (2002) tries to assess evidence on 
how discrimination in promotions affects workers.  Using self-reported information on perceived 
age discrimination in the HRS, he finds that older workers reporting that their employer gives 
preference to younger workers in promotions have lower wage growth and a reduced expectation 
of working past the early or normal social security retirement ages.  Of course self-reports can 
reflect negative outcomes other than discrimination, which Adams tries to account for by 
including controls for the perceived work environment and fairness of the respondent’s pay.  
Although in light of this problem evidence from self-reports is far from decisive, this research 
provides suggestive evidence that employers may discriminate in promotions, with deleterious 
effects on older workers, including leaving the labor force.
15 
The preceding review of the literature on age discrimination is not comprehensive.  But 
my view of the overall evidence (see also Neumark 2003 and 2008) is that it is more likely than 
not that labor markets were and still are characterized by discrimination against older workers.
16  
With respect to the issue of population aging, and in particular the burgeoning share of the 
potential workforce aged 65 and over, an important limitation of the existing literature on age 
discrimination is that it does not focus on this group.  Indeed, the research typically focuses on 
“younger” older workers, or broader older age groups extending down to younger ages. 
VI. The Effects of the ADEA and State Age Discrimination Laws   
  Neumark and Stock (1999) study the effects of both the federal ADEA and state laws 
barring age discrimination.  State variation prior to the federal variation is useful in disentangling 
the effects of the legislation from other changes affecting older versus younger individuals in the 
same period, such as social security, pensions, and health.  A potential limitation of this approach 
is that state laws and federal laws do not necessarily have the same effects.  However, the results 
suggest – as do those in Adams (2004), discussed below – that quite similar answers are obtained  
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from variation in state laws and variation in federal laws.   
Using Census data covering 1940-1980, for white men, Neumark and Stock find that age 
discrimination laws boost employment rates of the entire group of protected workers only 
slightly; but employment rates of protected workers aged 60 and over are increased substantially 
(by 6 percentage points).  However, prohibitions of mandatory retirement did not boost 
employment of older workers affected by the change, although the data are not very informative 
about this issue.  Adams (2004) uses a similar research design, focusing on the mid-1960s when 
a number of states passed age discrimination statutes and then the federal legislation took effect; 
he uses CPS data and also studies white men.  He finds larger employment effects for protected 
workers as a whole, with a 2.75 percentage point increase in their employment rate.  For those 
aged 60 or 65 and older, he finds more substantial increases of 3.6 to 4.1 percentage points.  The 
results are similar for the effects of state anti-discrimination statutes passed prior to the ADEA 
and the introduction of the ADEA in the other states.  He also finds that age discrimination laws 
are associated with lower probabilities that older protected individuals are retired.     
Adams also uses this approach to try to study how age discrimination laws affect hiring 
(as an increase in hiring could explain lower retirement).  However, his analysis is hampered 
because he does not use longitudinal data.  His best evidence examines how age discrimination 
laws affect the probability that individuals not employed at some time during the previous year, 
but looking for work, are employed in the current year.  The results point to negative but 
insignificant effects on hiring of protected workers overall, although a more disaggregated 
analysis suggests a large (16 percentage point) negative hiring effect for the oldest protected 
individuals (aged 65 and over), significant at the 10-percent level.  Although in general this and 
other evidence he presents on hiring is weak, Adams concludes that “One thing is clear … There 
is no evidence that suggests that there are positive effects for protected workers” (Adams  
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2004:237).   
Lahey (forthcoming) uses a different identification strategy to estimate the effects of age 
discrimination laws.  In particular, she focuses on the effects of state age discrimination laws 
relative to the federal law.  She argues that workers in states with their own age discrimination 
laws are protected by stronger laws than are workers in states without their own laws, for two 
reasons.  First, in states with their own laws workers have longer to file age discrimination 
claims.
17  And second, FEP agencies in these states may be able to process claims more quickly 
than the EEOC; however, she presents no evidence that states are more effective or efficient than 
the EEOC.  It is also important to clarify that what Lahey is calling an effect of an age 
discrimination law might more correctly be thought of as an effect of lengthening the period 
during which one can file an age discrimination claim (and having the option to file with the 
state as well), which simply may not be the same thing.
18   
Looking first at the period prior to 1978, before the Department of Labor gave 
administrative responsibility for ADEA enforcement to the EEOC, Lahey finds little evidence 
that state laws affected older workers.  In the subsequent period, however, her evidence suggests 
that state age discrimination laws reduced weeks worked of white men older than 50 years of 
age, made such individuals more likely to be retired, and reduced hiring of them (which she 
measures better than Adams by using matched CPS files).  Note that the employment (actually, 
weeks worked) results and the retirement results are the opposite of those in Adams’ work, and 
the employment results also contrast with those in Neumark and Stock.  In addition, the 
conclusions about adverse hiring effects are stronger than those Adams draws.  She suggests that 
because the ADEA makes it difficult to terminate the employment of older workers, it ends up 
deterring their hiring in the first place.  This may be exacerbated by the difficulty of bringing suit 
over age discrimination in hiring, as discussed earlier.   
15 
Lahey characterizes the pre-1978 period as one in which the ADEA had little effect, 
which is why she splits the sample into the pre-1978 period and the subsequent period.  
However, the results in Neumark and Stock indicated little difference between the effects of the 
ADEA on employment of older covered workers in the pre-1978 and post-1978 periods, with at 
most slightly larger impacts in the latter.  Nonetheless, if we were to accept Lahey’s 
characterization of the federal law as becoming effective (to a large extent) in 1978, then there is 
an important source of identifying information that she ignores – namely, the extension of the 
federal law to states without anti-discrimination laws.  Her evidence shows that between the pre-
1978 and the 1978-1991 period, the employment of worker over 50 years of age fell in states 
with their own age discrimination laws, relative to the states without their own laws (her Table 
2); there was no such change for those aged 50 and under.  This implicit difference-in-difference-
in-differences estimator suggests that when the federal law became more effective, employment 
of those older than age 50 increased precisely in the states that did not previously have state age 
discrimination laws.  This would seem to imply that age discrimination laws – at least the federal 
law – boosted employment of protected workers, contrary to Lahey’s conclusions. 
Overall, then, I do not regard this study as establishing that age discrimination laws act to 
deter hiring of older workers.  However, the logic of the argument, and hence the hypothesis that 
age discrimination laws deter hiring of older workers, may still be correct.  And recall that the 
evidence in Adams (2004) does not suggest any beneficial hiring effects of age discrimination 
laws, and perhaps the opposite, especially for those aged 65 and over.   
The evidence regarding hiring is discouraging for two reasons.  First, as noted earlier, the 
clearest indications of age discrimination prior to the ADEA, and during the period it has been in 
effect, concern hiring discrimination.  Yet the evidence points to no impact of age discrimination 
laws with regard to hiring, and possibly adverse effects.  Second, the evidence on changing  
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population structure and the labor force behavior of older individuals suggests that the most 
significant challenge in coming decades concerns barriers to hiring of older workers.  If, in fact, 
age discrimination laws – and the ADEA in particular – seem to deter hiring of older workers, 
then it seems difficult to see how the ADEA, at least as it is currently implemented and enforced, 
is going to help solve this problem.  Moreover, even if the ADEA (and state discrimination laws) 
do not deter hiring of older workers, they may do little if anything to help encourage such hiring 
or to break down discriminatory barriers to such hiring.   
Neumark and Stock (1999) also focused on the longer-term effects of age discrimination 
laws.  In Lazear’s (1979) seminal model of the employment relationship, firms find it difficult or 
costly to monitor workers’ effort, and hence use pay schemes to create incentives to work hard.  
In particular, workers and firms enter implicit long-term contracts that pay workers wages lower 
than their productivity when they are young, in order to motivate them to work hard, and make 
up the shortfall by paying workers wages higher than their productivity when they are older 
(more-tenured).
19  The key implication of Lazear’s model is that such implicit contracts lead to 
mandatory retirement, at the date when the present value of the streams of earnings and 
productivity are equal.  Furthermore, a contract with mandatory retirement is acceptable to 
workers ex ante, because the contract leads to higher productivity and earnings.  However, 
mandatory retirement occurs when the wage a worker is paid exceeds the value of their leisure 
time, so at the mandatory retirement age workers find mandatory retirement undesirable, and it 
may therefore appear discriminatory.  Based on this model, Lazear was strongly critical of the 
ADEA, focusing on amendments that raised the age of mandatory retirement and subsequently 
eliminated it.  In particular, he conjectured that the ADEA would serve mainly to give a windfall 
to older workers through the elimination of mandatory retirement – which was not 
discriminatory in the first place – while imposing longer-run efficiency costs.    
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Neumark and Stock (1999) re-examined this critique of the ADEA.  They began by 
considering the other problem posed by Lazear contracts – the incentive for firms to renege on 
these long-term contracts when workers are relatively older, terminating their employment 
before the mandatory retirement date and hence “cheating” workers out of the promised higher 
wage payments.  This behavior that would likely be construed as age discrimination – and could 
explain the high incidence of termination charges and cases under the ADEA.
20  They argue that 
the main effect of the ADEA could have been to deter this kind of reneging, strengthening the 
ability of workers and firms to take advantage of these contracts,
21 and they present evidence 
suggesting that this was the effect of age discrimination laws, in the form of steepening earnings 
profiles for cohorts entering the labor market subsequently.  Thus, the evidence presented in 
Neumark and Stock casts the effects of age discrimination laws in a more favorable light, 
arguing that such laws help to resolve problems with respect to terminations on career jobs. 
At the same time, Neumark and Stock’s (1999) findings attest to the importance of 
Lazear contracts.  As such, Lazear’s model may also help in understanding hiring difficulties 
faced by older workers looking for employment subsequent to their career jobs.  In order to 
create sufficient back-loading of pay to elicit effort from workers, an older worker seeking a new 
job may need to be paid much less than the wage on a longer-term career job he recently left.  
However, the worker may not be willing to accept such a low wage, especially a worker in his 
60’s, for example, who might have considerable uncertainty about how long he will work 
subsequently.  Moreover, with relatively short expected tenure at the new job, losing the job may 
not be very costly to the worker, implying that an even lower initial wage may be needed to 
create the right incentives.  This can explain why certain jobs may not be amenable to the hiring 
of older workers; indeed Hutchens (1986) and Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy (2000) present 
evidence suggesting that jobs with characteristics associated with Lazear-type contracts are in  
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fact less likely to be those into which older workers get hired.  This potential barrier to the hiring 
of older workers is problematic in light of the desirability of boosting hiring of older workers in 
coming decades.      
Another issue related to Lazear contracts that bears on the coming challenge of 
population aging stems from the shift from defined-benefit (DB) to defined-contribution (DC) 
pension plans.
22  Lazear (1979) originally argued that mandatory retirement is used to enforce 
termination of the employment relationship at the appropriate time.  Later, though, he noted that 
a DB pension plan could be structured that will induce retirement at the same date, by setting the 
maximum present value of the pension to peak at that date (Lazear 1995).  If employers 
previously used DB pension formulas to induce mandatory retirement, then as more and more 
workers arrive at older ages with DC plans, employers may find it more difficult to induce older 
workers to leave employment.  It is possible therefore that the shift toward DC pension plans 
may lead to a need for increased vigilance regarding age discrimination in terminations of older 
workers.  This has to be weighed against any other possible reasons for shifting the focus of age 
discrimination enforcement toward the hiring side.  That is, the aging of the population – which 
this paper emphasizes – is not the only change buffeting U.S. labor markets, and attention must 
be paid to other trends that have implications for age discrimination legislation and enforcement. 
VII. Age Discrimination-Related Challenges on the Horizon 
  In this section, I touch briefly on what I see as two key issues that are likely to become 
increasingly important regarding age discrimination laws and employment of older individuals, 
focusing in large part, but not exclusively, on employment of those aged 65 and over.   
Health Care Costs 
The relentless increase in health care costs and the costs to employers of providing health 
insurance are well-known.  Because health insurance costs are higher for older individuals and  
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workers (Lahey 2007; Sheiner 1999), rising health insurance costs seem poised to become an 
increasing drag on employment of older individuals.
23  As discussed earlier, the EEOC 
(following the Erie decision) made it easier to incorporate Medicare into health insurance 
packages for retirees without running afoul of the ADEA, by reducing concerns about equality 
of benefits between those under age 65 and those aged 65 and over who are eligible for 
Medicare.  With a growing share of the potential workforce aged 65 and over in coming decades, 
being able to employ older workers and cover them through Medicare obviously becomes 
increasingly attractive.   
One option worth considering is to extend EEOC rules regarding retirees to employees 
who are eligible for Medicare, making it easier for employers to cover workers eligible for 
Medicare under a combination of their own group health plans and Medicare, even if that might 
sometimes entail reductions in benefits and almost certainly would generate some differences in 
health insurance benefits for older and younger workers.  Current rules stipulate that for 
employers with 20 or more employees, if workers are covered by employer-sponsored group 
health plans, the group plan is the primary payer and Medicare is the secondary payer covering 
expenses not covered by the group plan.
24  Thus, under present Medicare rules employers could 
mainly cut health insurance costs for Medicare-eligible workers only by reducing group health 
benefits offered to older workers and letting Medicare pay these instead.  A simpler solution 
would be to make Medicare the primary payer, in which case group health plans would not have 
to delineate benefit differences between those eligible and those not eligible for Medicare, and 
indeed as long as the group health plan paid any benefits not covered by Medicare that would be 
paid to younger workers, issues of differences in treatment of younger and older workers would 
not arise.  The alternative is to continue to insist on equal benefits paid by employers, which 
could either reduce offerings of health insurance by employers that employ an older workforce,  
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or simply discourage the employment of workers aged 65 and over.
25     
On the other hand, the current law allowing companies to offer health insurance to full-
time but not to part-time workers (working fewer than 20 hours per week) might help mitigate 
the effects of rising costs to employers of providing health insurance, among older workers 
looking for employment subsequent to their career jobs, who are largely looking only for part-
time work and have Medicare coverage.  At the same time, the ability to avoid providing health 
insurance to part-time workers might lead to more part-time work as health insurance costs rise 
(Baicker and Chandra 2005), including among older workers.  Thus, rising health care costs 
coupled with difficulties of combining group health insurance plans and Medicare will likely 
pose problems for workers who reach age 65 and want to continue working full-time.   
Age and Disability 
  Because work-limiting disabilities rise with age (e.g., Stock and Beegle 2004),   
population aging implies that in coming decades more workers with age discrimination claims 
may also have the option of pursuing claims under the ADA as well as the ADEA.  The ADEA, 
like Title VII, includes an exception for bona fide occupational qualifications that can, in limited 
circumstances, be used to justify a relationship between age and labor market outcomes.  In 
contrast, the ADA offers no such exception.  As a result, the ADA may offer greater protection 
to older workers suffering some of the milder adverse consequences of aging that, under the 
ADEA, might be grounds for discharge or failure to hire (Posner 1995), but still be judged as 
amenable to “reasonable accommodation” by employers, in the language of the ADA.   
One implication of this line of reasoning is that population aging may interact with 
disability and protection under the ADA so as to provide more protection for older workers.  
However, the greater protection of older workers because of the ADA can cut both ways.  Some 
research suggests that the ADA reduced employment among disabled individuals (Acemoglu and  
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Angrist 2001; Deleire 2000), possibly stemming from both firing costs associated with wrongful 
termination suits, as well as difficulties in reducing discrimination in hiring or the costs of 
accommodating disabled workers.  If this is in fact the case, then the likelihood that older 
workers are more likely to be disabled and hence able to file suit under the ADA, coupled with 
the possibility of greater success under the ADA than under the ADEA, may deter employers 
from hiring them even if they are not disabled at the time of hire, out of a fear that they will 
subsequently become disabled and impose firing costs.   
Other research on the effects of state disability discrimination laws challenges the 
conclusions of the studies cited above, failing to find evidence of disemployment effects (Beegle 
and Stock 2003; Jolls and Prescott 2005).
26  However, the research on disability laws does not 
focus on workers aged 65 and older.  Thus, the evidence from this research may speak more to 
the consequences of disability-related discrimination laws for those with “traditional” disabilities 
unrelated to age rather than to those that are more the result of aging.  In addition, what we face 
going forward is the existence of both age discrimination and disability discrimination laws, and 
the research discussed above does not estimate their joint impact.   
Stock and Beegle (2004) study the joint impact of age and disability discrimination laws, 
based on state variation.  They find that for disabled individuals aged 40-64, when the two types 
of laws are combined, the employment effect is negative, relative to an age discrimination law 
alone.  Again, though, this evidence does not address those aged 65 and over.  However, they 
present results for this age group that do not distinguish by disability status of the individual, and 
here they find marginally significant evidence of employment reductions overall, and relative to 
40-64 year-olds.  Thus, it seems that there is some likelihood that the increasing share of older 
and disabled individuals in the population, coupled with the availability of disability-related 
discrimination claims for a growing share of workers protected under the ADEA, could  
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undermine some of the potentially beneficial effects of the ADEA as the population ages.   
VIII. Conclusions and Discussion   
  A number of conclusions can be drawn from the existing research on age discrimination 
and the effectiveness of the ADEA.  First, there is little doubt that the ADEA was a response to 
age discrimination.  This discrimination was more likely reflective of negative stereotypes about 
older workers than simply animus (“distaste”) towards older workers that affected hiring.  It may 
also have reflected employers’ incentives to renege on long-term commitments to workers.  
Second, enforcement of the ADEA has focused on terminations much more than hiring.  To 
some extent, this likely reflects the difficulties and potential rewards with regard to claiming 
discrimination in terminations versus hiring.  On the other hand, there is reason to believe that 
there has been discrimination – as defined by the law – with respect to terminations.  There is 
evidence suggesting continued discrimination against older individuals in hiring and other 
employment-related decisions such as promotions, although important challenges remain in 
establishing decisive evidence of age discrimination.  
Age discrimination laws – both state laws and the ADEA – boost the employment of 
older protected workers.  Although there is some contrary evidence on this point, it is less 
convincing.  There is some evidence suggesting that banning mandatory retirement had little 
effect on employment of older workers, but also some evidence to the contrary, and the jury is 
probably still out; there is also some evidence that age discrimination laws reduced retirement.  
There is no evidence indicating that the ADEA increased employment via increased hiring, and it 
is possible that it reduced hiring of older workers, perhaps because of increased costs of 
terminating such workers.  Finally, some evidence suggests that the principal effect of the ADEA 
was to strengthen the bonds leading to long-term employment relationships, by reducing the 
incentives for firms to terminate older employees who might be at the part of the employment  
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relationship where pay is higher than productivity.   
The conclusions just summarized are retrospective.  This paper has also offered a more 
speculative, prospective assessment, exploring how well the ADEA is likely to serve in 
addressing the future challenge of population aging.  This assessment and related considerations 
leads to a number of conclusions, and some thoughts about how age discrimination law might 
help meet the challenges likely to arise from an aging population.   
First, the coming decades will witness sizable increases in the share of the population 
aged 65 and over, an age range in which many workers leave their longer-term career jobs and 
move into part-time or shorter-term jobs.  As a consequence, potential problems stemming from 
age discrimination in hiring may became more important than they have been in past decades, 
when the baby boom was moving through the 40-64 age range – particularly in light of a public 
policy imperative to encourage continued employment of older individuals.  The evidence on 
both enforcement and effectiveness of the ADEA is troublesome in this regard, because it 
suggests that the ADEA may be relatively ineffective with regard to hiring of older workers.  
There may be limitations on how effectively the regulatory and legal system addresses 
discrimination in hiring, and it would be useful to consider whether this effectiveness can be 
increased.  The structure of civil rights laws and regulations provides not only for the same legal 
remedies available with regard to age discrimination, but also for affirmative action intended to 
actively encourage hiring of groups that have experienced discrimination in the past.  While 
controversial, this does at least provide an example of how hiring discrimination can be 
addressed more directly.  On the other hand, in crafting any policy changes intended to boost 
hiring of older workers, it is important to be mindful of underlying economic barriers to this 
hiring, and to try to focus on rooting out only the discriminatory behavior.     
Second, with an increasing share of the population aged 65 and over, an increasing  
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number of workers will be eligible for Medicare.  Coupled with rising health insurance costs, 
increasing the ability of employers to rely on Medicare for health insurance for eligible workers 
seems likely to make workers aged 65 and over more attractive.  Recent EEOC regulations have 
made it easier to wrap health insurance benefits around Medicare for retiree health plans.  There 
may be some merit to thinking about whether similar accommodation should be made for current 
employees eligible for Medicare.  However, if most workers in this age group seek and can find 
part-time work without health insurance benefits, then the problem may be mitigated.   
Third, because disability rates rise with age, the aging of the population implies that a 
rising share of workers covered by the ADEA may also experience work-limiting disabilities.  
Hence employers may have to be concerned with discrimination claims brought under the ADA 
as well as the ADEA, especially because claims brought under the ADA may be more likely to 
be successful.  There is some evidence that the combined impact of workers being protected by 
both laws is to reduce employment for those aged 65 and over, in which case the ADA may to 
some extent put a brake on the ability of the ADEA to help meet the challenge of trying to 
increase employment in an aging population.  There is not an obvious simple way out of this 
conundrum, but if further investigation reveals it to be real problem, then an important challenge 
will be thinking creatively about how to continue to protect the aged and disabled from 
employment discrimination while not scaring employers away from hiring older workers who are 
relatively likely to experience some disability as they age.  
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Figure 1: Actual and Projected Population Shares of Those Aged 20+ by Age 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates (www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/nat-
agesex.txt, viewed August 13, 2007), and U.S. Census Bureau Interim Projections 
(www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj, viewed August 8, 2007). 
 
 







































































































































Table 1: EEOC Receipt of Discrimination Charges, 2006 Fiscal Year 
 Total
a  ADEA ADA  Title  VII 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Total allegations
b  143,686  22,931 23,708 96,070 
Issues alleged (percent)
c       
Benefits .9  1.5  1.4  .7 
Demotion  1.8  2.7 1.4 1.7 
Discharge  31.6  36.8 35.9 29.5 
Discipline  5.3  4.8 4.1 5.7 
Harassment 16.1  8.6  8.0  20.0 
Hiring  4.2  8.4 4.9 3.1 
Layoff
  1.6  3.6 1.7 1.2 
Promotion  4.6  6.0 1.7 5.0 
Reasonable accommodation  3.3    18.3  .5 
Retirement-involuntary .2  .6  .2  .04 
Severance pay denied  .05  .1  .08  .03 
Terms/conditions  13.1  12.4 9.3 14.3 
Wages  4.1  3.3 1.3 4.2 
Waivers  .09  .15 .13 .06 
Other  13.1  11.2 11.6 14.0 
Discharge + layoff   33.2  40.4  37.6  30.7 
Source: Data supplied by the EEOC.  Cases can be filed under multiple statutes, such 
as the ADEA and the ADA.    
aTotal also include Equal Pay Act and a handful of unspecified charges.  
bTotal allegations can exceed number of charges, because a charge can include 
allegations under more than one statute. 
cAll issues that appear for age cases, as well as “Reasonable accommodation,” are 
shown.     
Table 2: EEOC Litigation Activity, 2006 Fiscal Year 
   Bases  alleged
a 
 Total  Age  Disability  Race  Sex 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Merit filings
b         
Total  383  43 49 81  180 
Individual  244       
Class  139       
Issues alleged
c         
Benefits 5  4       
Demotion  9  3  1  2 
Discharge  239  24 28 32  61 
Discipline  15  1 2 5  
Harassment 160  7    37  105 
Hiring 50  10  10  7  20 
Layoff
  14  4  3  6 
Promotion  22 5  2  10 5 
Reasonable  accommodation  29   19   
Retirement-involuntary 2  2     
Severance pay denied  1  1       
Terms/conditions 33  4    12  13 
Wages 13      5   
Waivers 3  1      7 
Other  39   3  9 6 
Discharge + layoff %  66%  65%  57%  43%  37% 
Hiring %  13%  23%  20%  9%  11% 
Source: Data supplied by the EEOC.  There are other bases not included in this table, so the 
second through fifth columns do not add up to the first.  On the other hand, a suit may allege 
multiple bases for discrimination.     
aThere are also numerous “retaliation” cases, which charge discrimination “against 
individuals who oppose unlawful discrimination or participate in an employment 
discrimination proceeding” (www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliation.html). 
bMerit filings include mainly direct lawsuits, and a handful of other interventions and actions 
to enforce conciliation agreements.   
cAll issues that appear for age cases, as well as “Wages” and “Reasonable accommodation,” 
are shown.     
Table 3: Unemployment Durations by Age, 2006 











  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
All
       
16-19 46.9 33.2 10.7 9.2 
20-24 41.6 30.1 13.9  14.5 
25-34 36.9 31.4 15.5  16.2 
35-44 34.1 29.8 15.9  20.2 
45-54 30.0 29.9 17.3  22.9 
55-64 31.8 25.0 15.3  27.9 
65+  38.4 27.0 13.8  20.8 
Men
       
16-19 46.1 32.3 11.1  10.6 
20-24 40.0 29.4 14.2  16.6 
25-34 36.8 31.1 15.7  16.4 
35-44 34.1 29.9 15.3  20.6 
45-54 30.1 28.3 17.2  24.6 
55-64 31.4 24.2 15.1  29.2 
65+  39.8 25.0 12.5  22.7 
Women
       
16-19 48.0 34.3 10.3 7.5 
20-24 43.6 31.1 13.4  11.7 
25-34 37.1 31.6 15.3  15.9 
35-44 33.9 29.7 16.6  19.8 
45-54 30.0 31.7 17.4  21.2 
55-64 32.5 26.0 15.5  26.4 
65+  38.0 29.6 15.5  18.3 
Source: Employment and Earnings 





1 I provide a broader review of age discrimination legislation in the United States and related 
research in Neumark (2003); here, I emphasize newer research.     
2 See www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm#annual, viewed August 8, 2007. 
3 A related concept is that of “phased retirement” (e.g., Wiatrowski 2001), whereby older 
employees continue with their current employer but are rehired as consultants or part-
time/seasonal workers, reduce their hours, enter job-sharing arrangements, or move to less 
stressful jobs, etc., while partially drawing on their pensions.  The ability of employers to 
implement phased retirement probably depends more on ERISA and the IRS code, although 
Penner et al. (2002) suggest that murkiness in the ADEA’s treatment of retirement benefits 
could deter employers from implementing phased retirement.   
4 For details, see http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_filing.html and  
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_processing.html, viewed October 22, 2007. 
5 According to EEOC regulations, when there is a state age discrimination law, the charge is 
“dual filed” with the EEOC if the individual files a charge with the FEP, and vice versa.  The 
intent is to reduce duplication of effort.  However, the charge is usually retained by the 
jurisdiction with which the charge is filed.  (See 
www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_filing.html, viewed October 23, 2007.)  Because of 
differences in state laws, there may sometimes be a better chance of prevailing by filing under 
a state law.  For example, in some states age discrimination is covered under a human rights 
statute with no provision for a defense that outcomes  correlated with age are based on 
“reasonable factors other than age” 
(http://www.dorsey.com/publications/legal_detail.aspx?FlashNavID=pubs_legal&pubid=1880 
 
61603, viewed October 23, 2007).   
6 Of course EEOC litigation represents only a fraction of the total number of discrimination-
related lawsuits, which includes a much larger number brought by private attorneys.  On the 
other hand, according to the EEOC the success rate of their lawsuits is far higher than that in 
suits brought by private attorneys (www.eeoc.gov/press/8-13-02.html, viewed August 23 
2007), which likely reflects the EEOC choosing the strongest cases that it thinks it can win, as 
well as perhaps the greater difficulty of prevailing against the EEOC.  
7 For discussion of these issues, see, e.g., Bloch (1994), Issacharoff and Harris (1997), and 
Posner (1995).   
8 See www.eeoc.gov/policy/regs/retiree_benefits/qanda-retireehealthbenefits.html, viewed 
August 15, 2007. 
9 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Section 1625.10. 
10 “Disparate impact” refers to practices that may not have discriminatory intent, but have an 
unjustified adverse impact on members of a protected class.  
11 Note that some state laws, such as in Minnesota, explicitly allowed disparate impact cases 
before (see www.humanrights.state.mn.us/rsonline7/overview.html, viewed August 29, 2007).   
12 The report argued that age discrimination was not driven by animus toward older workers, 
but rather by assumptions “about the effect of age on [workers’] … ability to do a job when 
there is in fact no basis for those assumptions” (p. 20, bracketed phrase added).  
13 Note, though, that even if we view the data on durations as possibly indicating 
discrimination against older individuals looking for work, the problem is not most severe for 
those aged 65 and over – the group that will represent a growing share of the potential 
workforce in coming decades.  
 
14 Earlier research used these methods to study discrimination by race, ethnicity, and sex.  See, 
e.g., Fix and Struyk (1993), Heckman (1998), Neumark (1996), and Riach and Rich (2002).  
15 Johnson and Neumark (1997) studied self-reported age discrimination in earlier work.   
16 In addition to the types of evidence discussed here, one might note that the large volume of 
age discrimination litigation decided in favor of plaintiffs suggests the existence of such 
discrimination.  This argument has some merit, although it at best can establish isolated cases 
of discrimination, rather than telling us anything about the pervasiveness of such 
discrimination.       
17 In particular, in states that do not have their own statutes, workers must file a claim with the 
EEOC within 180 days, whereas when the state has its own statute and an FEP commission or 
agency, the worker has 300 days to file with the state’s FEP agency or the EEOC.  Lahey 
argues that that law has permitted workers to file with both the EEOC and the state FEP within 
300 days.  However, some states have shorter filing deadlines, and it is not apparent that a 
claim filed after the state deadline will be considered by the state FEP.   
18 As noted earlier, state laws also sometimes differ in terms of the types of defenses they 
allow.  This variation is conceivably more important than differences in the length of time to 
file claims.  
19 There is a good deal of research documenting evidence consistent with Lazear’s model, 
including, for example, evidence presented in his original paper, as well as in Lazear and 
Moore (1984), Hutchens (1987), Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), and Hellerstein and Neumark 
(2007). 
20 Lazear does not explicitly label reneging on long-term implicit contracts as “age 
discrimination.”  But this kind of firm cheating has been characterized as discrimination in  
 
other work, such as Gottschalk (1982), who explores the conditions under which this is more 
or less likely to occur, and Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1991), who focus on age 
discrimination in terminations.  
21 Jolls (1996) makes a similar argument.  Neumark and Stock also contend that the increase in 
the mandatory retirement age was less important, based on earlier work suggesting it had little 
effect on retirement behavior.     
22 See, e.g., Papke (1997) and Friedberg and Webb (2003).  Neumark (2006) discusses some 
of the hypotheses regarding why this change occurred.    
23 On the other hand, increases in state health insurance mandates – such as for infertility 
treatment – or policy changes such as the introduction of pure community rating (Adams 
2007) – which prevents insurance carriers from charging different premiums based on the ages 
of a firm’s workforce – may increase the relative cost of insuring younger workers.   
24 In contrast, for retiree health plans Medicare is the primary payer.    
25 Scott et al. (1995) present evidence from the 1979-1991 period that firms offering health 
care plans were less likely to hire workers aged 55-64.  See also Goda et al. (2007), who 
suggest that the Medicare as Secondary Payer rule leads to lower wages for workers aged 65 
and over, which in turn reduces labor supply substantially. 
26 Jolls and Prescott’s conclusions are more mixed.  However, they find no longer-term 
disemployment effects. 